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A STRATEGY FOR RESTORING AMERICA’S
NATIONAL PARKS
BY HOLLY LIPPKE FRETWELL* AND MICHAEL J.

PODOLSKY**

A change is taking place across the American landscape. Hikers,
climbers, and picnickers are finding a way to promote better care of
our resources; they are paying to play. Until recently, Americans paid
almost nothing for recreational access to federal lands. Yet “free”
recreation has often meant starving parks of resources to improve
eroding roads, fix leaking sewer systems, and provide visitor services.
Americans are beginning to realize that if resources are not managed
correctly, the opportunities for outdoor recreation and the quality of
outdoor experiences decline severely.
A great deal of federally owned land is used for recreation.
Although the National Park Service, which controls 83 million acres,
is the organization most people identify with federally provided
outdoor recreation areas, the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management have more acreage and receive more recreational
visitors. These lands cover 455 million acres and, according to
governmental estimates, host about 1 billion visitors each year,
compared to 290 million visits in our national parks.
The Federal government, one of the largest providers of
recreational services, has begun to explore alternative methods of
funding. Under the experimental Fee Demonstration Program,
Congress allows agencies to charge higher fees and to keep most of
these fees where they are collected rather than sending them to the
national treasury. Four agencies—the National Park Service, the
Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
Forest Service—are trying new entrance and user fees on some of

* Holly Lippke Fretwell is a Research Associate with the Political Economy Research
Center, 502 South 19th Avenue, Suite 211, Bozeman, MT 59718. She has a MS in resource
economics from Montana State University. This article draws on Holly Lippke Fretwell, Paying
to Play: The Fee Demonstration Program, PERC POLICY SERIES, December 1999.
**Michael J. Podolsky is a law clerk for the Honorable David A. Katz of the Northern District
of Ohio. He was a ROE Fellow with the Political Economy Research Center and a graduate of
the Case Western Reserve University School of Law, and has a Ph.D. in Energy and
Environmental Management and Policy from the University of Pennsylvania.
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their units, and each park or area is allowed to keep at least 80
percent of the fee receipts.
This article argues that allowing public land managers to retain
user fees to cover expenses will encourage better fiscal and
environmental responsibility. Fiscal autonomy solves important
problems for land managers. By leaving at least eighty percent of the
fees in the park or area that collected the funds, park managers
become directly accountable for the quality of stewardship and
services. Fiscal autonomy also reverses the distorted incentives that
the political annual appropriations process fosters. Moreover,
charging those who consume the services for the cost of producing
them provides potentially critical financial resources for park
managers. In addition to explaining the problems with the current
funding system and the benefits that fiscal autonomy provides, the
article will assess the Fee Demonstration Program and identify ways
to improve it.
Part I provides a brief overview of the history of the national
park system. Part II describes the current state of the parks and their
role in recreation, and discusses the reasons why the current method
of congressional funding distorts incentives for park managers to
provide proper stewardship of our parks and their resources. Part III
demonstrates the means for getting the incentives right while taking
into account the competing concerns of efficiency and equity.
Furthermore, it shows how the Fee Demonstration Program
implemented through a congressional statute is a first step in
accomplishing this goal and discusses the legal constraints that the
Fee Demonstration Program must satisfy to meet constitutional
requirements for the imposition of a fee as compared to a general tax.
Part IV addresses the current status of user fees in state parks.
Finally, Part V provides the conclusion and recommendations for the
future.
I. HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM
Ironically, at their inception, the national parks were intended to
be self-supporting with managers directly accountable for
expenditures. Under the initial model of park system operations,
congressional appropriations were to be limited to initial investments
in roads and visitor facilities. Ferdinand Hayden, one of the early
explorers of Yellowstone National Park, the country’s first national
park, assured Congress that the park would require no appropriated
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funds.1 In fact, when Yellowstone National Park was created in 1872,
no money was appropriated for its operation. All involved believed
that income from leases would be sufficient to “operate the necessary
highways and providing a proper police force.”2 Indeed, even as late
as 1916, at least five parks proved that their income earning
3
capabilities were sufficient to cover operating expenses. The receipts
from these fees were held in a special account, accessible to the Park
Service without congressional appropriation, which could be used for
road maintenance, park development, and administration.
Although the Yellowstone leases never met expectations nor was
the revenue derived adequate to build the necessary infrastructure to
4
service the park, Congress did not appropriate any funds for
5
Yellowstone until 1878. Park revenues were sufficient to cover
operating expenses, but the lack of funding to cover boundary
enforcement and the initial development of park resources hampered
management of Yellowstone National Park from the beginning.6 In
fact, early on, Yellowstone was dependent upon the army for law
enforcement and management.7
By the early 1900s, the initial model of direct accountability was
being replaced by the current model of congressionally controlled
parks. Political and financial influences encouraged the progression
toward congressionally controlled parks and away from local
accountability. For example, Crater Lake National Park established
in 1902, Mesa Verde created in 1906, Rocky Mountain and Lassen
Volcano national parks established in 1915 and 1916, respectively,
were not authorized by statute to retain revenues for administrative
or other uses: Revenues generated in these parks reverted to the
8
General Treasury. In 1916, as part of the progression of the
congressionally controlled parks model, Congress passed a bill that
1. R. Andrew McDaniel, The National Parks on a Business Basis: Stephen Mather and
the National Park Service 2 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Political Economy
Research Center).
2. HIRAM MARTIN CHITTENDEN, THE YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK 110 (Richard
A.Bartlett ed., 1964).
3. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 2 INCREASING ENTRANCE FEES – NATIONAL PARK
SERVICE (1982).
4. See CHITTENDEN, supra note 2, at 110.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 110-11 (describing how the shortage of funds hindered operations at
Yellowstone at the time of its inception).
7. See HORACE M. ALBRIGHT & MARIAN ALBRIGHT SCHENK, CREATING THE
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: THE MISSING YEARS 225-26 (1999).
8. See McDaniel, supra note 1 at 7.
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created the national park system and President Wilson signed it into
9
law. Stephen Mather, the first director of the National Park Service,
tried unsuccessfully to persuade Congress that all park revenues
should be retained for park use.10 By 1918, however, Congress began
11
to require that all park fees revert to the federal treasury.
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Figure 1 - National Park Service Units and Acres

Source: NPS 2002 Budget Justifications, NPS 206
The park system has expanded substantially.
Figure 1
demonstrates that preservation of wilderness and natural areas
continued to progress beyond Yellowstone National Park and has
continued at an ever-increasing rate. The increase was especially
12
rapid in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The parks’ increasing
dependency on annual appropriations to pay for operating
expenditures has forced managers to respond to political wishes and
9. See ALBRIGHT & SCHENK, supra note 7, at 146-48.
10. See McDaniel, supra note 1, at 7 (outlining Mather’s view that direct control over park
visitor fees was “instrumental for their [the parks] proper management”). See also BARRY
MACKINTOSH, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, A LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1-3
(1983) (describing Mather and other park proponents belief that retention of park revenues was
essential to acquiring complete managerial control over national parks).
11. See MACKINTOSH, supra note 10, at 3. Mackintosh explains that based on his belief
that Mather and other officials of the Departments of Interior and War had exceeded their
authority in arranging for all park fees to be set aside in an account that could be used without
congressional approval, John. J. Fitzgerald, Chairman of the House Interior Appropriations
Sub-Committee, introduced legislation requiring all receipts to be remitted to the Treasury.
12. The Alaska National Interest Conservation Act contributed more than 40 million acres
to the National Park System as of 1980.
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short-term planning rather than careful resource and environmental
stewardship. As Horace Albright, one of the primary driving forces
behind the creation of the national park system stated:
With fear and trepidation, I appeared before the House and Senate
committees to ask for additional appropriations. My point was that
Congress created the National Park Service but gave us no money
to operate our Washington office. I was up at the Capitol, hat in
hand, begging for some appropriations to see us through until
money could be allocated in the spring for the full fiscal year of
13
1918.

Appropriations to cover the Washington office operations were
eventually appropriated, but as Albright described in order to obtain
the funds, “‘I had crawled on my knees in sack cloth and ashes
14
begging for the money.” The situation did not get easier as the years
passed. Albright referred to the annual appropriations process as the
15
agonizing “rite of spring.” The message was clear that to receive
funding park system managers and staff must cater to political desires
of Congress.
Unfortunately, the import of his message remains true today.
The early politicization of the national park system continues to
obstruct resource management and stewardship. Because they are
dependent on the politicized annual appropriation process, the Park
Service and other federal land managers are subject to the demands
of politicians whose directives must be followed, even when not in the
best interest of resource stewardship and visitor benefits.
The appropriations process reduces federal land managers’
accountability and provides perverse incentives for them. The
incentives are to satisfy the appropriator rather than the visitor or the
needs of the natural environment. As the next sections demonstrate,
this combination of diminished accountability and perverse incentives
continues today. By providing an independent source of funds, the
Fee Demonstration Program corrects some of these distorted
incentives and produces significant improvements in land and
resource management where it has been implemented. In fact, the
creation of a self-sustaining source of funds for federal areas would
fulfill the original vision for the operation of the nation’s parks,
forests, and other recreational lands. Unfortunately, the scope of the
program is limited and needs to be expanded.

13. See ALBRIGHT & SCHENK, supra note 7, at 148.
14. Id. at 205.
15. Id. at 278.
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S. NATIONAL PARKS AND
DISTORTING INCENTIVES
A. Current State
The current system of park financing is based on funding from
the federal treasury as allocated by the political process through
annual congressional appropriations. This system’s consequences
include poor maintenance, a crumbling infrastructure, excessive
spending on unnecessary or inappropriate projects, over-expansion of
the park system, neglect of natural resources, underfunding of studies
to improve their current state and a crowding out of the private
provision of recreation. While some argue that the severity of the
16
situation is the result of a lack of funding, the state of national parks
is more the result of perverse incentives for local park managers to
satisfy political needs.
Figure 2 - Federal Land Agency Operating Budgets
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Figure 2 shows that operating budgets for the National Park
Service, the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
16. See Richard J. Ansson Jr., Our National Parks-Over Crowded, Underfunded, and
Besieged with a Myriad of Vexing Problem: How Can We Best Fund Our Imperiled National
Park System, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 1, 2 (1998) (asserting that the terrible state of the
national park system, including construction projects, land purchases and resource stewardship
projects, is a result of an accumulated $11.1 billion shortfall).
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have, on average, increased substantially over the passed four
decades. Still there does not appear to be any foreseeable solution to
the maintenance and infrastructure problems plaguing the parks due
to the combined impact of the politization of park management and
the lack of proper incentives for park managers.
1. Poor Maintenance and Crumbling Infrastructure
The National Park Service reports a $6 to $9 billion backlog of
unfunded maintenance, acquisition, and resource management
projects.17 Park managers are unable to invest because they do not
control the resource decisions for the parks. While operating budgets
continue to rise at rates faster than inflation,18 infrastructure is left to
rot. For example, Yellowstone’s outmoded sewer system spews raw
sewage into native trout streams, and the sewage treatment plant at
Old Faithful pollutes the groundwater.19 Glacier National Park’s
popular Going-to-the-Sun Road is frequently closed due to safety
20
concerns and prehistoric dwellings in Mesa Verde National Park are
disintegrating from a buildup of oils and airborne particles.21 In
addition, more than one-quarter of the National Park Service’s
22
buildings are in poor or dilapidated condition.
While the news media have emphasized the Park Service’s
problems, the Forest Service also has serious maintenance problems.
Indeed, the current level of funding has been described as merely
23
“enough to sustain the current rate of rot.” This is not a new
problem. With a road system of 373,000 miles, eight times the
interstate highway system, the Forest Service has a road maintenance
backlog in excess of $8.5 billion, with funding adequate to maintain
only 40 percent of the roads to planned standards.24 According to

17. See Denise M. Visconti, Reform in the National Park System, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
409, 409-412 n. 15 (citing statements found from the congressional record estimating the
financial backlog of maintenance, repair, acquisition and resource stewardship projects).
18. See Donald R. Leal & Holly Lippke Fretwell, Back to the Future to Save Our Parks,
PERC POLICY SERIES, June 1997, at 1.
19. See Holly Lippke Fretwell, Paying to Play: The Fee Demonstration Program, PERC
POLICY SERIES, December 1999, at 3.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Visconti, supra note 17, at 417 n.37 (citing Improvements to the National Park
System: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic Preservation, and
Recreation of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 105th Cong. 13 (1997)
(statement of Roger Kennedy, Director of the National Park Service)).
24. USDA, Road Management Website, USDA Forest Service, available at
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Dick Paterson, deputy director of recreation for the Forest Service,
the agency has a backlog of $1.7 billion in unfunded recreational
25
maintenance.
When a crisis does occur due to the lack of investment in
maintenance and infrastructure, Congress seizes the opportunity to
save the day and reap the windfall of correcting a crisis that the
politization of the park system has itself created. Former comptroller
of Yellowstone National Park, Don Striker has stated: “a sewage spill
makes the perfect example of deferred maintenance” and providing
funds to repair this kinds of environmental hazard has big political
rewards.26 As Striker notes: “Nothing gets attention quicker than two,
if not three ruptures in the antiquated sewer system. Those spills
moved us up three notches in the priority system.”
2. Extravagant Spending
In spite of the backlog of maintenance projects described above,
public agencies often spend money unwisely and even extravagantly.
At Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area, for example, one
famous outhouse cost $333,000.27 It has a gabled slate roof, cottagestyle porches, and a tapered cobblestone masonry foundation in the
28
fashion of Frank Lloyd Wright. But the doors are locked in the
winter because the self-composting toilet will not work in
Pennsylvania’s freezing temperatures.29 And do not expect any
30
running water; there is none. In 1997 in Yosemite National Park the
average cost of new employee housing was $580,000 per unit—two to
four times the average rate for local housing.31 The new deluxe
housing accommodates fewer than 60 of the park’s 5,000 employees;
32
many still dwell in tent-cabins without running water.
http://www.fs.fed.us/eng/road_mgt/DOCroadanalysis.shtml/ (last modified 1999).
25. Gordon Gregory, Protesters: Fees Devalue Wilderness Experience; Coordinated Rallies
in Nine States Decry a User-Pay Test Program, which U.S. Agencies Say Aids Upkeep and Plugs
Budget Gaps, OREGONIAN, August 15, 1999, at D1.
26. Jane S. Shaw, Perfect Spills, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, 32 (Sept./Oct. 2001)
(discussing maintenance problems in national parks due to budget cuts).
27. See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 4.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Frank Greve, Park Service Defends Price Of Outhouse, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Oct.
8, 1997 (discussing expenses incurred during Parks Service improvements).
31. See John H. Cushman, For National Parks’ Employees, a Housing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 1997, at A1.
32. See id. (discussing that in 1997 in Yosemite National Park the average cost of new
employee housing was $580,000 per unit—two to four times the average rate for local housing).
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Importantly, such extravagant or unnecessary expenditures are
often due to the requirements of congressional appropriations. As
part of the appropriations process members of Congress may
“earmark” spending for specific projects designed to appeal to their
home constituency without taking into account the real needs of the
park system.33 Since 1987, for every one dollar of Park Service
requested construction projects, Congress has appropriated
approximately two dollars for their own specific construction
projects.34
For example, $3 million was earmarked for Glacier National
Park to restore a historic backcountry chalet system visited by less
35
than one percent of park visitors. National Park Service officials
say, however, they could have allocated the funds to higher priority
uses instead of chalet restoration, which was very low on the park’s
“to do” list.36 More pressing needs include repair of the Going-to-the37
Sun Road (used by 1,720,784 visitors in 2000), improvements to
visitor centers and restoration of the antiquated sewer system.38
As already discussed, part of the problem is that park managers
do not make all the spending decisions. Under the politicized
congressional appropriations process, the park’s priorities have to
wait. Those who do control the resources lack the incentives and the
authority to invest wisely. The political process makes it more
expedient to spend resources on a noticeable or mandatory, even if
unnecessary, item rather than to pay for general upkeep.
3. Natural Resources on the Decline
Degradation on the federal estate is much deeper than
infrastructure. The condition of natural resources, often what the
lands are set-aside to protect, is also declining. The Wilderness
Society has developed a list of the country’s most endangered
wildlands. The report reveals that environmental threats are on the

33. See Annson Jr. supra note 16, at 19-20 (explaining that every congressman would either
like to procure a national park for his district or fund new construction projects for existing
parks already in his district).
34. See id. at 20.
35. See National Parks Service, FY01 Greenbook Overview, National Parks Service,
available at http://data2.itc.nps.gov/budgetwab/fy2001/overview.pdf (2001).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Edward T. Pound, Costly Outhouses Monuments to Red Tape, USA TODAY, Dec.
15, 1997, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/acovmon.html.
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rise across all of our federal lands.39 In 1994 the National Parks
Conservation Association (NPCA), a private organization that
monitors park conditions, issued a “parks report card” that rated
three out of four parks at “C” or below.40 The preservation of cultural
and natural resources, the core mission of the Park Service, is often
neglected. For example,
• Biological diversity is declining in many parks, according to a
prominent group of wildlife biologists, partly because
41
ecological research is minimal.
• Because many park resources are unaccounted for, the actual
state of many natural resources is largely unknown. In 1995,
the GAO noted that “Most park managers lack sufficient
data to determine the overall condition of their parks’
42
natural and cultural resources.”.
• Of the threatened and endangered species that make
national parks their home, only 19 percent have shown any
43
population improvement.
Other federal land mangers also have to deal with deteriorating
natural resources. For example,
• An estimated 39 million acres of our federal lands in the
intermountain West are at risk of uncontrollable,
44
catastrophic wildfire. Nearly a decade of fire suppression in
the region has changed the forest structure from once
savannah-like pine forests to dense fir stands that are
susceptible to bug infestation, disease, and conflagration.45

39. See WILDERNESS SOCIETY, 15 MOST ENDANGERED WILDLANDS, 1999: PUTTING
CONSERVATION FIRST, available at http://www.wilderness.org/newsroom/15most/ (1999).
40. Report of the National Parks & Conservation Association, National Park Conditions:
A Survey of Park Superintendents; Summary of Findings, Colorado State University (1994).
Grading, A through F, was based on the following criteria: natural resources, cultural resources,
condition of infrastructure, quality of visitor information and programs, law enforcement,
workforce and budget issues, availability of special programs. Data was provided via mailed
survey to park superintendents.
41. FREDERIC H. WAGNER ET AL., WILDLIFE POLICIES IN THE U.S. NATIONAL PARKS 62
(1995).
42. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE NATIONAL PARKS: DIFFICULT CHOICES NEED TO BE
MADE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PARKS, 1 (1995).
43. National Park Service, Rethinking the National Parks for the 21st Century, available at
http//www.nps.gov/policy/report.htm (last visited on Apr. 8, 2003).
44. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WESTERN NATIONAL FORESTS: A COHESIVE
STRATEGY IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRE THREATS 6 (1999).
45. Holly Lippke Fretwell, Forests: Do We Get What We Pay For? 1999 Pol. Econ. Res.
Ctr. Pub. Lands Rep.
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Two-thirds of public grazing lands remain in less than good
condition, according to a 1988 GAO report. Stream and
riparian areas continue to be overgrazed.46

4. Expansion
As shown above in Figure 1, the park system has continued to
expand even though the current system is in a state of disrepair. In
fact, the number of national parks has increased to approximately
47
379. This rapid growth represents an increase of nearly 45% in the
number of parks in the system since 1970, in spite of the fact that the
responsible government agency has been unable to maintain those
parks already in the system. Congressional and executive branch
actors are responding to the incentives of the political process by
expanding areas for their constituency, a process referred to as
“thinning the blood.” Also cited as “park barrel politics” many new
parks slide into the system to provide money for their congressional
district. For example, nearly half a million each year is spent to
preserve the Charles Pinckney National Historic Site, a house built
after Pickney’s death to memorialize his contributions to writing the
U.S. Constitution.48 Thus, while more new parks, national heritage
centers, national historic sites, rivers, and battlefields are added to the
system, the slice of appropriations left to fund existing parks (like
Yellowstone, Grand Teton, and the Everglades) is diminished.
5. Overcrowding
The number of visitors to the national park system has increased
sharply over the last 30 years. Since 1970 the number of people
visiting national parks has more than doubled, rising from
49
A
approximately 133 million visitors to almost 270 million.
Consumer Reports survey found overcrowding and lack of facility
50
maintenance to be among the greatest concerns of park visitors.
Park managers are having trouble handling the number of
visitors.
• Yosemite National Park is restricting park entry on the
busiest days. Since 1993, the park entrance has been closed
46. Karl Hess Jr. & Jerry L. Holechek, Beyond the Grazing Fee: An Agenda for Rangeland
Reform, 4 POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 234 (July 13, 1995) available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
pas/pa-234.html.
47. National Park Service, supra note 35, at NPS-171.
48. Id. at 128.
49. Annson Jr., supra note 16, at 9.
50. Rating the Parks, CONSUMER REPORTS, June 10-17, 1997, at 12.
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several times each year due to gridlock in the valley.51
• The Grand Canyon has become so congested that a public
transportation system is planned. On an average summer
day, 6,500 cars show up at the South Rim, but there are only
52
2,400 parking spaces.
Increased crowds interfere with the quality of the park
experience. Unlike theme park customers, those visiting national
parks often choose parks as destinations because they desire to
escape crowds and congestion. Overcrowding is a sign that the
mechanism used to regulate access is not functioning adequately.
Currently, parks restrict access by head counts or other similar
mechanisms rather than by price. By charging a fee for entering
parks and varying price according to demand (e.g. charging more for
summer visitors than for winter visitors), the park service can reduce
overcrowding. Such a system would mirror “peak load” pricing used
in the electric utility industry.53 The implementation of such a system,
however, would require legislative oversight. In addition, it is the
sheer number of visitors that provide park managers with political
capital to obtain funds through the appropriation process.
6. Crowding Out of Private Providers
The harm caused by the current financing system extends beyond
federal lands. By charging below-cost fees, public managers
discourage others from providing outdoor recreation. Why aren’t
there more Kampgrounds of America, more youth hostels? Why isn’t
more hunting, hiking, and camping available on private lands?
Federal recreation is available at such low prices that private
landowners, who must pay the full cost of their businesses, have
trouble competing. Even where private landowners do compete they
must do so by supplying other forms of recreation: theme parks,
amusement centers, and the sometimes garish museums often located
near national parks. Thus, private landowners are either deterred
from offering any recreational services or from offering services that
compete with public lands. Ironically, the lack of private providers

51. Fretwell, supra note 19, at 5.
52. Id. at 10.
53. TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 180-81
(1992) (explaining that because demand for goods or services at peak time impose “special”
additional costs, peak-load pricing charges a higher marginal or incremental cost to those
consuming services at peak times and lower marginal or incremental costs to those consuming at
non-peak times).
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only reinforces the demand for more federal lands that suffer from
the severe disabilities discussed above.
For example, the privately owned Kentucky Caverns, once called
Mammoth Onyx Cave, is part of the same karst (limestone formation)
as Mammoth Cave National Park. It has been open for public tours
since 1927. Since 1946, when nearby Mammoth Cave was designated
a national park, the cave managers have had a heavily subsidized
competitor. The National Park Service dropped the fees for touring
the cave from the once-competitive rate of about $3 per person early
in the century to $1.50.54 Because the Park Service charged such low
fees for cave tours, the Kentucky Caverns owner had to offer
distinctive and unusual features just to keep people coming.55 The
owner could not continue to offer simple cave tours.
In the 1970s, the owner, Bill Austin, decided to create a North
56
American wildlife exhibit. This would mean adding bison to the
existing stock of elk and white-tailed deer.57 But in the 1980s, another
nearby federal recreation site began offering below-cost competition
58
on this as well. The Land Between the Lakes Recreation Area,
operated by the federally owned Tennessee Valley Authority,
introduced an elk herd that visitors could see without charge.59
Unable to compete with the free attraction, Austin shifted gears
again.60 He replaced elk with kangaroos, emus, and Aboriginal
artifacts from Australia.61 The facility is now known as Kentucky
62
Down Under, an animal park with an Australian theme.
The example of International Paper, one of the largest timber
producers in the United States, illustrates the obstacles posed by
below-cost recreation on federal lands. It varies the management of
its timber holdings depending on whether or not those holdings are
63
surrounded by federal recreation land. In Arkansas, Louisiana, and

54. Interview with Joy Lions, Chief of Program Services, Mammoth Cave National Park
(Sept. 16, 1999). Cave tour fees have since increased from $1.50 in 1980 up to $7 in 1998.
55. Interview with Bill Austin, owner, Kentucky Down Under (Aug. 11, 1999).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Telephone Communication with Tom Bourland, wildlife biologist with Crawford and
Bourland, Inc., Shreveport, LA, (May 26, 1999). Bourland was previously employed as
International Paper’s wildlife manager for the mid-south region.
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Texas, where the company is surrounded by private land,
64
International Paper encourages wildlife and outdoor recreation.
Although the company has allowed access to hunters and campers for
many years, it began to aggressively market its land to hunting clubs,
65
individual hunters, and family campers in 1983. By 1986, recreation
revenues had reached $2 million, which amounted to 25 percent of
International Paper’s total profits in the region.66 By 1999, recreation
67
revenues from the region totaled $5 million.
As proceeds from recreation increased, the company’s managers
deliberately made the land more attractive to its visitors. Trees are
now left standing for wild-animal corridors, age diversity in the
forests is maintained to support more wildlife variety, and buffers are
68
preserved along watersheds and streambeds. Nearly two-thirds of
the company’s six million acres are managed for recreation across the
nation.69
In the Pacific Northwest, however, where International Paper
recently sold most of its holdings, none of the company’s land was
70
managed for recreation. The federal government owns nearly half
of all lands in the Pacific Northwest,71 and most of International
Paper’s holdings were surrounded by national forest.72 Because
hunting and camping are mostly free on Forest Service lands, the
company could not earn from hunters and campers revenues
necessary to cover its costs. As a result, regional managers paid little
or no attention to recreational values and lacked incentive to improve
and protect wildlife habitat. “Free” recreation on federal land
discourages others from providing it.
B. Distorting Incentives
Distorted incentives stemming from the current system of
financing are causing the deterioration of our recreational lands. To
procure their budgets, land managers must respond to political

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Fretwell, supra note 45, at 18.
TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPITALISTS: DOING GOOD
WHILE DOING WELL 7 (1997).
69. Telephone Communication with Tom Bourland, supra note 63.
70. See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 8.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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power, as illustrated recently in Glacier National Park. The park’s
managers want funds for road and sewer repair, yet Montana’s
congressional delegation earmarked $6 million to rebuild a
backcountry chalet system used by fewer than one percent of park
73
74
visitors. A single, self-composting privy has already cost $1 million.
According to retired National Park Service Director Roger
Kennedy, more money is spent on “congressionally identified”
75
initiatives than on projects recommended by Park Service personnel.
Politicians find it more appealing to cut the ribbon of a newly
constructed facility than repair an existing sewer system. From 1978
to 1997, spending for major Park Service repairs and renovations fell
at an inflation-adjusted rate of 3.6 percent per year.76 Evidence
indicates that federal agencies, like nearly all governmental
77
institutions, tend to let maintenance suffer. Maintenance is almost
always neglected until deterioration is so severe that it becomes an
“infrastructure crisis”—at which time politicians can rush out and
take credit for fixing it. While private companies consider preventive
maintenance to be a long-term investment that affects the future
productivity of a business, government officials do not have an
incentive to maintain the long-term value of their “business.” Rather,
they have an incentive to “defer routine maintenance until major
restoration or new capital purchases . . . are required.”78 One reason
for this is that unlike maintenance, new capital expenditures can be
financed with borrowed funds, deferring the costs into the future.
In addition, because visitors are not paying the bill, public land
managers tend to ignore their wishes. For example, in 1996
Yellowstone park managers closed the Norris campground and two
79
museums, saving the park $70,000 in operating expenses. Ironically,
even at low prices, the campground alone brought in revenues of
80
$116,000, well above the cost of operation. Managers ignored these

73. See Pound, supra note 38.
74. Id.
75. See Frank Greve, Senior Legislators Claim Park Funds for Pet Projects, WASHINGTON
POST, Dec. 1, 1997, at A23.
76. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2000 (1999), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/
fy2000/other.html (downloadable Excel spreadsheet).
77. See Richard L. Stroup & Sandra L. Goodman, Property Rights, Environmental
Resources, and the Future, 15 HARV. J. L.& PUB. POL’Y 427, 427-54 (1992).
78. Id. at 439.
79. See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 9.
80. Id.
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revenues because the money went to the national treasury, not to the
81
park itself for use in Yellowstone. Thus, the park managers saved
operating expenses by closing the campground and the museum, but
taxpayers lost $46,000 and visitors lost the use of facilities that they
clearly valued.
Exasperating the financial problems under the congressional
appropriations process, any unspent funds are returned to the
national treasury. This means that park managers who carefully
conserved funds would not only go unrewarded but would, in fact, be
penalized. The likely result of their prudence would be a smaller
budget the next year. Further, emergency funds are rarely available.
Hence, the majority of agency discretionary funds are retained
throughout the year, the remainder being spent in the final days
before the fiscal year ends. Former Yellowstone National Park
comptroller, Don Striker, estimates that 75 percent of the park’s
82
discretionary budget is spent in the last two weeks of the fiscal year.
It is clear that the problem is incentives rather than the level of
funding. From 1978 to 1997, the National Park Service’s operating
budget increased from nearly $800 million to about $1.2 billion, an
average annual increase of 2.3 percent above inflation.83 Full-time
staff has increased from 15,836 to 17,216 employees, an 8.7 percent
84
increase. Yet visitation grew at a slower rate of only 1.2 percent per
year from 1978 to 1997.85 Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management budgets have also grown beyond inflation by about 1.2
86
percent and 1.5 percent, respectively.
Occasional legislative changes allowed some revenues to stay
where they were collected; these actions led almost inevitably to an
equal decrease in appropriations the following year. For example,
legislation passed by Congress in 1972 specified that visitor fees on
87
federal lands be used by the agency that collected them. The intent
was to encourage agencies to collect more fees. However, the
executive branch’s Office of Budget and Management and Congress

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Interview with Don Striker, Comptroller, Yellowstone National Park (Apr. 20, 1997).
Interview with Don Striker, Comptroller, Yellowstone National Park (Oct. 5, 2001).
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 76.
Leal & Fretwell, supra note 18, at 2.
See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 8.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 76.
See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 8.
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offset the fees by an equal decline in budget appropriations, thus
eliminating any incentive to raise revenues.88
In general, financial support from recreation users has been
minimal. Recreation fees covered only seven percent of the National
89
Park Service’s operating budget in 1995. In that year, only one Park
Service unit, Arches National Park in Utah, generated receipts that
exceeded its operating budget. Even under the Fee Demonstration
Program, fees in 2000 represented only 11 percent of the Park
Service’s total operating budget.90 As for the Forest Service and
Bureau of Land Management, they lose an average $355 million
91
annually on recreation management. In other words, they spend
$355 million more on recreation each year than they receive in
recreation fees.
III. GETTING THE INCENTIVES RIGHT
To solve the problems identified in Part II, we must redirect the
incentives public land managers face. First, local managers must have
flexibility to manage both financial and natural resources to meet
area goals and be held accountable for their actions. Second,
revenues generated at the park must be retained for on-site
management. This will create incentives to respond to the demand
for resource and facility upkeep. Fortunately, a straightforward
method of accomplishing both of these objectives exists and has
already proven itself through the Fee Demonstration Program, user
fees that park managers can direct to local use.
A. Efficiency
User fees are prices that government agencies charge to
92
consumers of services the government provides. From an economic
efficiency perspective, user fees, when properly applied, result in a
88. MACKINTOSH, supra note 10, at 70 (describing OMB’s view that visitor fees were a
bonus that could be used to offset the National Park Service’s budget requests).
89. Leal & Fretwell, supra note 18, at 3.
90. See NAT’L. PARK SERV., NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 2002 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS,
supra note 37, at 222; U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (NAT’L. PARK SERV., U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.) & U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. (U.S. FOREST SERV.),
RECREATIONAL FEE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL
YEAR 2000 7 (2001).
91. See HOLLY LIPPKE FRETWELL, PUBLIC LANDS: THE PRICE WE PAY 12 (1998).
92. See Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 67 B.U.L. REV. 795, 800 (1987) (defining a user fee as payment that reflects
the value of service received).
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more efficient allocation of goods and services. When consumers face
an artificially low marginal price for a good or service, the net result is
a level of consumption that exceeds the economically efficient level.
However, when consumers face an appropriate price, their
consumption of goods and services creates a situation in which the
marginal benefit of consumption equals the marginal cost.93 In the
case of parks, this means that, at the margin, the number of visitors
and the benefits they derive from using the resources equals the cost.
It is important to understand that a reduction in visits or visitors
may have positive, not negative effects if overcrowding is a cause of
degradation to resources and recreation quality. Reducing the
number of visitors can relieve environmental stress and increase
visitor enjoyment. Hence, assuming an elastic demand, in which
demand for goods or services are sensitive to changes in price,
imposition of user fees can assuage further degradation and crowding
of the park system. Evidence described below suggests, in response
to the Fee Demonstration Program, demand has not fallen in any
meaningful way to date. This may imply that user fees are still too
low or that visitor demand is inelastic, or insensitive to changes in
price. Both are likely to play a role.
One solution to the problem described above is to implement
“peak” or differential pricing that varies the user fee depending on
the time of year or the attraction visited. Fees would be higher during
popular times of the year, such as the summer, as compared to less
94
popular times, such as the winter. Fees might also vary according to
the attraction park entrants wish to visit. Lower prices might be
charged to visit the less popular attractions. Perhaps park managers,
vested with both authority and accountability, might combine these
approaches or create other methods of alleviating overcrowding
through the development of new alternative attractions. As discussed
below, New Hampshire has successfully employed differential pricing
in its state park system. These approaches represent an alternative to
the more drastic solution of simply raising prices across the board to
induce further reductions in the number of visits or visitors.
Reducing park congestion does not necessarily require pricing people
out of parks.

93. See id. at 809-11 (explaining that efficient pricing deters consumption of additional
units of public goods and services up to the point where the marginal benefit equals the
marginal cost to society).
94. See TIETENBERG, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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B. Fairness
Notwithstanding enhancing economic efficiency, the imposition
of a user fee will have other important impacts. First, user fees do
add a fresh source of income to what Congress currently annually
appropriates, and this additional income facilitates the movement
toward a balanced budget for maintaining and operating the parks.
Second, by leaving approximately 80 percent of the funds collected in
each park, individual park managers, freed from political pressures
attached to annual appropriations, may direct these funds to uses in
which the associated benefits are the highest. Incidentally, this may
offer another explanation as to why parks participating in the Fee
Demonstration Program have not seen an appreciable reduction in
the number of visits or visitors.95 In addition, consumer reaction to the
imposition of the user fee provides information regarding the amount
of the good or service to provide guiding park managers on how to
use their overall budget including revenues from user fees and annual
congressional appropriations.96
Of course, there is likely to be significant resistance to the
implementation of a user fee, or an increased user fee, especially
where to date, the perception has been that government provides the
good for free. In fact, many may argue that moving from a system of
financing government goods and services such as national parks
through general tax revenues is unfair. However, quite the contrary
is true. While fairness may be defined in a number of ways, true
fairness dictates that people pay for what they consume. Under the
current system of financing for national parks, those who do not use
the parks subsidize those who do since Congress pays for park
operations out of general tax revenues.97
Imposition of a user fee does not forestall important equity
considerations. For example, if there is a significant concern that low
income persons would be unable to afford a user fee for entering a
national park, nothing precludes the relevant government agency or
95. To the extent that the user fees are used to improve park maintenance and
infrastructure, and thus people’s experience in the park, demand may actually be increasing due
to an interaction between price and quality of experience resulting in an outward shift in
demand for any level of the user fee.
96. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 92, at 806 (asserting that user fees exhibit evidence
of people’s willingness to pay for goods and services that informs government decisions to either
increase or decrease the current amount provided).
97. See id. at 814-15(contending that user fees are fair since they reduce the burden on
those taxpayers who do not themselves consume the good or service and thus receive little or no
direct benefits).
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specific park with providing a subsidy to these particular individuals
rather than providing a single subsidy program to all regardless of
ability to pay. In fact, national forests in Oregon and Washington
have addressed the issue by providing persons volunteering a day of
trail work with the Washington Trails Association, a partnership
group, with a free single-day trail pass.98 Two days of labor earn an
annual permit.99 Moreover, targeting specific persons allows the park
system to charge an economically efficient user fee and avoid the
gross problems of overuse associated with current congressional
funding of the national park system. Finally, given that the anecdotal
information shows little drop in visitation to date, it seems fair to say
that fairness concerns have not yet materialized.
C. The Fee Demonstration Program
In 1996, in search of alternative methods to obtain funds for our
federal lands, Congress authorized the Fee Demonstration
100
Program. The program provides increased funding to help restore
degrading facilities and to help meet growing needs on our public
lands. Four agencies are participating—the National Park Service, the
Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Fish and
Wildlife Service.101
In fiscal year 2001, fee demonstration projects were operating at
415 sites. These included 137 sites managed by the Park Service, 100
by the Bureau of Land Management, 91 by the Fish and Wildlife
102
Revenues from fees have
Service, and 87 by the Forest Service.
doubled since the program began, increasing from about $93 million
in fiscal year 1996, before the program was implemented, to nearly
$200 million in fiscal year 2000.103 Of course, fees still represent a
small portion of total agency budgets.

98. Fretwell, supra note 19, at 14.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 10.
101. Each agency may choose up to one hundred sites at which higher fees or new fees can
be charged. At least 80 percent of the fee revenues must be retained at the site where they are
collected, with the remainder spent at agency discretion. Fee revenues can fund a broad array
of activities ranging from costs of fee collection to resource preservation and law enforcement.
The program is authorized to operate through 2001 and allows agencies until the end of fiscal
year 2004 to spend the revenues collected.
102. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 90, at 1, 4.
103. Id.
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Initial reports suggest that the demonstration program is a
qualified success.104 Despite higher fees, visitor numbers for all
agencies were up 7 percent between 1996 and 2000.105 And visitor
response to surveys has been positive. From May 30 through August
18, 1997, the Cooperative Park Studies Unit of the University of
Minnesota’s College of Natural Resources conducted a survey at
eleven units of the National Park System to study people’s reactions
to the Fee Demonstration Program.106 Respondents came from all
fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam and twentyfour foreign nations. The following is a summary of their results:
• 96% of the respondents said the new fees would not
107
influence their decision to make future park visits.
• 71% of the respondents felt the new fees were about right;
12% thought the new fees were too low; and only 17%
108
thought the new fees were too high.
According to the study, the results were consistent across several
important variables over which a significant amount of variation in
109
results is often controlled for as part of surveys. These variables
included gender, age, education, race or ethnicity, and nationality.110
Survey results were also consistent across park units, day, time and
method of data collection.111 The method of data collection included
questionnaires and 26 focus groups. Overall, the survey concluded
112
that visitors strongly support the Fee Demonstration Program.
The one caveat of the study is that of the 17 percent of those
individuals that felt the new fees were too high, the vast majority
104. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RECREATION FEES: DEMONSTRATION FEE
PROGRAM SUCCESSFUL IN RAISING REVENUES BUT COULD BE IMPROVED 2-3 (1998) available
at http://www.nps.gov/feedemo/rc99007.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2003).
105. This provides only a preliminary indicator of the impact because the report does not
incorporate other factors that affect visitation such as weather, construction, and the state of the
economy.
106. See ALLEN L. LUNDGREN ET. AL., MONITORING 1997 PARK VISITOR REACTIONS TO
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE RECREATIONAL FEE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM RESEARCH
SUMMARY, COOPERATIVE PARK STUDIES UNIT, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, COLLEGE OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, available at http://www.nps.gov/pub_aff/feedemo/visitor.htm (last
visited Apr. 14, 2003).
107. See id. at 3.
108. See id. at 2.
109. See id. at 3.
110. See id. (explaining that despite the diversity in the characteristics of survey respondents
their reactions to the Fee Demonstration Program were similar).
111. See id. (noting the consistency of survey respondents across date, time and method of
data collection including onsite questionnaires, focus groups and informal discussions).
112. Id. at 4.
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Table 1 shows the income

Table –1
Income Distribution of Survey Respondents Who Felt the
New Fees Were Too High
Income
$65,000 or more
13%
$40,000 to $64,999
18%
$25,000 to $39,999
17%
$15,000 to $24,999
24%
$14,000 or less
28%
Source: Figure 3 from ALLEN L. LUNDGREN, DAVID W. LIME, CYNTHIA
A. WARZECHA & JERILYN L. THOMPSON, MONITORING 1997 PARK
VISITOR REACTIONS TO THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE RECREATIONAL
FEE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM RESEARCH SUMMARY, COOPERATIVE
PARK STUDIES UNIT, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, COLLEGE OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, available at
http://www.nps.gov/pub_aff/feedemo/visitor.htm

Some might argue that these results suggest that the concerns of
those questioning the fairness of the Fee Demonstration Program
may be valid to some extent as over 52 percent of those who believed
113
the new fees to be too high had incomes of less than $25,000.
However, drawing such an inference is unwarranted for several
reasons. First, it is unclear whether the fact that those who have less
income think prices are too high demonstrates anything significant
about fundamental fairness.
Second, putting this number in
perspective, it represents only 9 percent of the total survey
respondents.114 While one could argue that fairness dictates a
redistribution of income so that all people can enter the parks for
free, one can also argue that people should pay for the park services
they use through entrance fees just as people pay for the electricity
and water they consume.115
113. See id. at 2-3.
114. See id. at 2. Only 17 percent of the total survey respondents thought the new fees were
too high, and 52 percent of those had an annual income of less than $25,000. This 52 percent
represents only 9 percent of total survey respondents.
115. Granted, electricity and water utilities often provide special assistance to low-income
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Furthermore, a simple analysis demonstrates that other costs,
particularly transportation, not the entrance fees associated with the
Fee Demonstration Program, represent the real barriers that lowincome persons face in visiting national parks.116 Consider a trip from
July 22 to July 29, 2001 to Yellowstone National Park. Based on data
from the Energy Information Administration, the average cost of all
types of gasoline, including leaded and unleaded, was $1.30 per gallon
117
from 1996-2000. Next, choosing three cities from different parts of
the country, San Francisco, Phoenix, and Cleveland and applying this
average per gallon cost yields an estimated round trip fuel cost of
$141, $145 and $225, respectively, for a trip to Yellowstone National
Park.118 Several other costs must also be factored into the cost of

households. However, such assistance is usually provided on a case-by-case basis, not a blanket
policy like the historical policy of free uncontrolled access to national parks. A similar approach
could be employed as part of a permanent park fee system by subsidizing lower income visitors
on an individual basis. Nevertheless, as discussed below, given that on average, entrance fees
comprise a very small percentage of the total cost of visiting a national park, subsidies might be
better directed at more significant costs such as transportation.
116. This argument is premised on the Travel Cost Method (TCM) or Recreational Demand
Models, an economic technique for estimating benefits from the recreational use of natural
resources. See SCOTT J. CALLAN & JANET M. THOMAS, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS &
MANAGEMENT, 246 (1st ed. 1996) (defining TCM as the use of “the complementary
relationship between the quality of natural resources and its recreational use value”). TCM is
an accepted technique within the mainstream of the economics community and has been
applied in a variety of studies. See e.g., Nancy E. Bockstael, et al., Measuring the Benefits of
Improvements in Water Quality: The Chesapeake Bay, 6 MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS 1
(1989); Nancy E. Bockstael et al., Estimating the Value of Water Quality Improvements in
Recreational Demand Framework, 23 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 951 (1987); MARION
CLAWSON, METHODS FOR MEASURING THE DEMAND FOR AND VALUE OF OUTDOOR
RECREATION (1959); Robert Mendelsohn, Modeling the Demand for Outdoor Recreation, 23
WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 961 (1987); J.F. Dwyer et. al., Estimating the Value of Urban
Forests Using the Travel Cost Method, 9 JOURNAL OF ARBORICULTURE 182 (1983); Jeffrey E.
Englin & Robert Mendelsohn, A Hedonic Travel Cost Analysis for Valuation of Multiple
Components of Site Quality: The Recreation Value of Forest Management, 21 JOURNAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 275 (1991); V. Kerry Smith & William H.
Desvouges, The Generalized Travel Cost Model and Water Quality Benefits: A Reconsideration,
52 SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 371 (1985); V. Kerry Smith et. al., Estimating Water
Quality Benefits: An Econometric Analysis, 50 SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 422 (1983);
John K. Mullen & Fredric C. Menz, The Effect of Acidification Damages on the Economic Value
of the Adirondack Fishery to New York Anglers, 67 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL
ECONOMICS 112 (1985); William J. Vaughan & Clifford S. Russell, Valuing a Fishing Day: An
Application of a Systematic Varying Parameter Model, 58 LAND ECONOMICS 450 (1982).
117. See Table 9.4 – Motor Gasoline Retail Price, U.S. City Average available at
http://www/eia.doe.gov/pub/energy.overview/monthly.energy/txt/mer9-4.
118. See MapQuest at http://www.mapquest.com (estimating one-way mileages for from the
airport in San Francisco, Phoenix and Cleveland to Bozeman, MT were 1085, 1117 and 1730,
respectively). Driving transportation costs were estimated by multiplying the average cost per
gallon of gasoline with the estimated round trip mileage to drive from each city to Yellow Stone
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driving. For example, the driving time from each of these cities is 22,
24.5 and 29 hours, respectively. Assuming that a family of three is
taking the trip, $35 per day on food is a conservative estimate of daily
food costs. From San Francisco, assuming that it takes two days to
drive each way, the round trip cost of food is $140.00. Likewise,
assuming it takes two days to drive from Phoenix and three from
Cleveland, the round trip food costs would equal $140.00 and $210.00.
The total cost of driving would then be $281.00 from San Francisco,
$285 from Phoenix and $435.00 from Cleveland. Since these cost
estimates do not include any tolls, lodging or other incidentals, they
must be considered conservative estimates.
Alternatively, if one were to fly from these cities to Bozeman,
the cheapest flight would have been $361.50, $345.60, and $577.00 per
119
person. Assuming the same family of three was to fly from each city
to Bozeman the total cost of the flights would have been $1084.50,
$1036.80 and $1731.00. Staying six nights in Bozeman costs $561.00,
or on average, $93.50 per night for hotel and does not include food
and other costs.120 Finally, even if the family is going to spend more
than one day in the park, the family may enter and re-enter as often
121
as they wish over a seven day period for as little as $20.00.
When compared to all of the other costs, the $20.00 entrance fee
would not seem to be the deciding factor in whether a family will
travel to Yellowstone, regardless of the income level. Other costs,
such as travel and lodging, appear to dominate the decision. Indeed,
as shown in Table 2, using the costs outlined above, the $20.00
entrance fee is less than 2 percent of the cost of a vacation that
includes Yellowstone regardless of the mode of travel used.

National Park and return.
119. See Worldweb Reservations available through any number of Internet search engines
and Alaska/Horizon Flight Selection, available at http://shopping.alaskaair.com/fairlist
(representing the lowest cost roundtrip fare charged on Northwest Airlines from Cleveland and
Alaska Airlines from Phoenix and San Francisco to Bozeman, MT for the period July 22-July
29, 2001). A Saturday night stay over was selected to obtain the lowest cost fare. Northwest
was selected because it flies the most direct route to Bozeman from Cleveland with only one
stop in Minneapolis. Alaska Airlines was chosen as it only makes one stop in traveling to
Bozeman and is also a low-cost carrier.
120. The per night cost of staying at a hotel is the average of daily rate charged using a
AAA Motor Club discount at the Holiday Inn ($98 per night) and the Fairfield Inn ($89 per
night) in Bozeman, MT for the period July 22- 29, 2001. Each hotel was contacted directly to
obtain rate information.
121. See Yellowstone National Park.Com at http://www.yellowstonenationalpark.
com/information.htm (last modified on June 28, 2003).
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Table - 2
Entrance Fee as a Percentage of the Cost of a Vacation that
Includes At Least One Visit Yellowstone National Park
City

Cleveland
San Francisco
Phoenix

Cost of
Vacation if
Driving

Entrance
Fee as a
Percentage
of Cost if
Driving

Cost of
Vacation if
Flying

Entrance
Fee as a
Percentage
of Cost if
Flying

$1206
$1192
$1196

1.7%
1.7%
1.7%

$2502
$1856
$1808

0.7%
1.1%
1.1%

The entrance fee will not prohibit anyone from taking a destination
visit to Yellowstone or any other national park where the travel cost
122
Such fees, however,
represents a substantial majority of the cost.
may affect visits to parks where travel costs are not of great concern.
As demonstrated below, the tangible benefits of the Fee
Demonstration Program outweigh any of the minor burdens imposed
on individual parties. There are also less obvious positive impacts
that make possible the tangible benefits and thus also serve to tip the
balance in favor of the Fee Demonstration Program. The program
provides participating federal areas with a revenue stream that is
independent of the annual appropriations process. Though not
currently replacing all funds provided through congressional
appropriations, fees from the program depoliticize, at least in part,
the funding of park, forest, and other federal land operations.
Managers need not fully concern themselves with the political whims
122. Table 3 further demonstrates that the entrance fees are not onerous or unfair. In Table
3, the entrance fee to Yellowstone National Park, taken as a percentage of the conservatively
estimated transportation costs, shows that the $20.00 fee is no more than 4.8% of the cost.
Table – 3
Entrance Fee as a Percentage of the Cost of Travelling to Yellowstone National Park
City
Cost of
Entrance Fee as a
Cost of
Entrance Fee as
Vacation if
Percentage of Cost if
Vacation if
a Percentage of
Driving
Driving
Flying
Cost if Flying
Cleveland
$435
4.6%
$1731
1.2%
San Francisco
$421
4.8%
$1085
1.8%
Phoenix
$425
4.7%
$1037
1.9%
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of senators and congressman who oversee their appropriations bills.
They are able to direct funds to those items such as road
maintenance, water systems upgrades, trash collection, and resource
stewardship, all of which have been neglected because of line item
funding and other budget requirements included in appropriations
bills. Still, it is worth noting that because the Fee Demonstration
Program focuses solely on recreation fees, recreation opportunities
and visitor demand for them will take priority over other
management functions.123
At the same time, independent judgment together with reduced
political ties makes federal land managers more accountable both to
their superiors and to visitors for the use of funds and the results
obtained. Such accountability can be an important motivation to
manage federal lands efficiently and to provide the best recreational
opportunities possible. Managers can be evaluated less on their
political prowess and more on their ability to effectively administer
national parks and forests.
Finally, as Table 4 illustrates, even for the Forest Service, where
the support for fees has been less than the other agencies, overall
reaction to the fees has been positive. Granted, in the summer of
1999, a one-day protest was organized to oppose the program,
especially at Forest Service sites where no fees had previously been
124
charged, and several congressmen, including fiscal conservatives,
tried to eliminate the Forest Service from the Fee Demonstration
125
Program. Even so, a Forest Service survey indicated high to neutral
acceptance of fees on public lands from 60 percent of the
126
respondents. The results in Table 4 illustrate this overall positive
response. These results are based on a site-by-site analysis that the
Forest Service conducted at six sites, analysis of national comment
cards, and a random sample of 109 newspapers since 1996.127

123. This is similar to the Forest Service focusing on timber harvest once a portion of fees
was retained for restoration under the Knudson-Vandenburg Act.
124. See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 11.
125. Id. at 11.
126. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., supra note 90, at 1. See
also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 104, at 80-85.
127. See U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. (U.S. FOREST SERV.), RECREATION FEE DEMONSTRATION
PROGRAM: INVESTING IN THE GREAT OUTDOORS, available at http://www.fs.fed.us/recreation/
fee_demo/fee_intro.shtml 4 (2000).
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Table – 4
Forrest Service Sites – Public Reaction To User Fees Under the
Fee Demonstration Program
Site
Positive
Negative
Boundary Water Canoe Area
87%
13%
Vail Pass Winter Recreation Area
46%
22%
Desolation Wilderness
64-78%
22-36%
White Mountain National Forrest
68-72%
15-16%
Cataract Lake Fee Area
64%
14%
Tonto National Forrest
55-64%
22-26%
National Comment Cards
77%
19%
News Article Analysis
65%
35%
Source: USDA FOREST SERVICE, RECREATION FEE DEMONSTRATION
PROGRAM: INVESTING IN THE GREAT OUTDOORS, available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/recreation/fee_demo/fee_intro.shtml (2000).

Other survey results are consistent with the overall positive
128
results from the University of Minnesota study. These results
include:
• The Fish and Wildlife Service found that 86 percent of
visitors surveyed considered the fees to be about the right
129
amount.
• A Bureau of Land Management visitor survey indicated the
130
majority of respondents found fees to be about right.
• Interest groups that monitor federal recreation, including the
American
Recreation
Coalition,
National
Parks
Conservation
Association,
and
Washington
State
131
Mountaineers, have also supported the program.
In one specific example, Rocky Mountain National Park increased its
entrance fee by $5, some camping fees by $2 and other camping fees
by $6. The number of visitors in 1995 decreased only 3.4 percent
from 1994, the year in which it had seen the highest number of visitors
to the park. The total increase in revenue for the park was projected

128.
129.
130.
131.

LUNDGREN ET. AL., supra note 106.
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 90, at 8.
Id.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 104, at 85.
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to be as much as $1.5 million, which would be used to help address a
$50 million maintenance back log in the park.132
It is too early to evaluate the Fee Demonstration Program
completely. Only 24 percent of the new fee receipts had been spent
by March 1998, when the General Accounting Office prepared its
133
comprehensive report. However, some evidence is available. At
first, the costs of fee collection itself consumed nearly 30 percent of
134
any new revenues. Parks charging new fees had to set up fee
stations and arrange for sale of passes near the parks.135 Indeed, the
most noticeable effects of the program have involved pricing and fee
collection. For example, thirty Park Service sites have installed
automated fee-collection machines, which accept cash or credit
136
cards. As visitors approach within fifty miles of Grand Canyon
National Park, they can pre-purchase passes, then zip through a
dedicated lane at the park entrance rather than wait to purchase entry
permits. Other such changes include:
• Visitors heading toward one of four southern California
national forests can purchase a permit at any of 350 local
137
businesses.
• White Mountain National Forest in New Hampshire requires
a trail park permit but allows visitors without a pre138
purchased forest permit 14 days to mail in payment.
• A visit to the Web page of Paria Canyon-Coyote Buttes in
Utah, managed by the Bureau of Land Management,
provides information about location and reservation
availability (entry into the canyon is limited to twenty
backpackers per day). Interested parties can purchase a
139
backpacking permit online.
While improving fee collection took time and money, it was not
the biggest expenditure. As many had hoped, the largest portion of
the new fees is being used to improve services, repair and
maintenance, and protection of natural resources previously

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 24, 1996, at 8A.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 104, at 34.
See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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neglected.140 The results are very positive. Table 5 lists the manner in
which in the Forest Service spends fees collected as part of the Fee
Demonstration Program in Fiscal Year 1999.
Table –5
Forest Service Allocation of Revenue from the Fee
Demonstration Program
Fiscal Year 1999
Expenditure
General Operations (trash collection, restroom
30.8%
maintenance)
Cost of Collection
18.8%
Repairs and Maintenance
10.8%
Signs
10.3%
Upgrading Facilities
6.2%
Health and Safety
6.0%
Law Enforcement
3.5%
Resource Preservation
3.1%
Other Costs
2.6%
Habitat Improvement
0.4%
Source: USDA FOREST SERVICE, RECREATION FEE DEMONSTRATION
PROGRAM: INVESTING IN THE GREAT OUTDOORS, available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/recreation/fee_demo/fee_intro.shtml (2000).

Other specific examples of expenditures from across the national
park and forest system include the following:
• Natural Bridges National Monument in Utah, which is
managed by the Park Service, used fees to rebuild 5,000 feet
of deteriorating trails. The monument had not had a trails
maintenance and repair program in over thirteen years; it
141
now has a trail maintenance crew of five.
• Fees helped Grand Teton National Park survey wildlife in
142
the park and monitor water quality.
• At the Forest Service’s Mount St. Helens National
Monument, fees kept open three visitor centers that

140. Id. at 13.
141. Letter from Keith Stegall, SEUG Trails Coordinator, Canyonlands National Park (Dec.
18, 1998) (on file with author).
142. Interview with Bob Schiller, Chief of Resource Management (Oct. 6, 1999).
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otherwise might have been closed. Other funds at Mount St.
Helens were used for plowing snow to provide early access to
the monument’s popular Windy Ridge and Lava Canyon
areas.143
• The Waterside Theater on Roanoke Island is being repaired,
and all costs are being covered from recreation demonstration
144
program fees.
• Fees from the demonstration program are being used to repair
the Carl Sandburg National Historic Site. Significantly, the
fee revenues used in this project were from the portion of the
fees collected at parks participating in the demonstration
program to those parks or sites that were not. According to
Connie Backlund, superintendent of the site, the repairs
would not have been possible without revenues from the Fee
145
Demonstration Program.
• At Zion National Park, revenues from fees are being used to
improve seemingly mundane yet very important items
including improving trail-heads, providing restroom facilities
at trailheads, and providing regular trash collection. Fees are
also used to enhance signage along trails and to pay for
146
additional rangers, along with search and rescue operations.
Managers at some agencies are experimenting with differential
pricing, a technique typical of the private sector. Some Bureau of
Land Management and Forest Service sites have begun to charge
lower weekday prices to encourage midweek rather than weekend
147
visitation.
• At Tonto National Forest in Arizona, an annual day-use pass
valid seven days a week costs $90 per year. But a $60 pass is
148
valid Monday through Thursday.
• At the Lower Deschutes Wild and Scenic River in Oregon,
the Bureau of Land Management charges a $10 camping fee
143. See USDA FOREST SERV., Mount St. Helens Lowers Some Prices After First Season of
Fee Collections, available at http://www.fs.fed.us/gpnf/press/1998/pr91.htm (Jan. 5, 1998).
144. See Jerry Allegood, ‘Lost Colony’ Theatre Getting $350,000 in
Improvements, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER OF RALEIGH, Jan. 20, 2000, at A-

3.
145. See Julie Ball, Flat Rock: Carl Sandberg Site Under Renovation,
ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Dec. 23, 1999, at B2.
146. See Craig Martin, Backcountry User Fees are Becoming More Common in National
Parks, THE SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, May 6, 1999, at C-1.
147. These prices were in effect in mid-1999.
148. See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 13.
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per site per day on summer weekends, but only $5 in the
149
middle of the week and during off-season weekends.
• A trails pass program on Washington and Oregon national
forests costs trail users $3 a day or $25 annually to park at
150
trail heads.
The Forest Service has found that differential pricing increases
151
public acceptance of fees. Users can choose a pass that meets their
specific needs, and lower-income users have better access.152 It also
helps disperse visitation into shoulder seasons, which reduces
operating costs by reducing the need for additional staff, facilities,
and maintenance and decreasing damage to resources.
There are shortcomings in the initial implementation of the fee
programs. Confusing, layered, and excessive fees still abound. For
example, hiking in the Olympic National Forest in Washington
153
requires a trailhead parking fee of $10 per vehicle per week. While
there are no backcountry or overnight fees on the national forest,
when the trail crosses the boundary into Olympic National Park,
hikers become subject to a $5 backcountry hiking permit and $2 per
night fee—neither of which is available for purchase on the national
forest.154
In some cases, managers have responded innovatively to
complaints. White Mountain National Forest in New Hampshire
restructured its fees to require payment only in areas where visitors’
155
fees would be put to use: trails, picnic areas, and campsites.
Compliance doubled, from 30 to 65 percent, greatly reducing the cost
of enforcement.156 Similarly, after one year in the program, the Forest
Service managers at Mount St. Helens cut the annual pass from $24 to
157
$16, with no charge during the winter months.
In some cases, cooperation among land agencies can eliminate
duplication and confusion. In Utah, for example, a single entrance fee
provides entrance to the Park Service’s Timpanogos Cave National
149. Id. at 13-14.
150. Id. at 14.
151. Id.
152. See U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR AND U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC, supra note 90, at 33.
153. Interview with Katherine A. Fuller, Supervisory Park Ranger, Olympic National Park
(Mar. 4, 2002).
154. See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 14.
155. Id.
156. Interview with Tom Moore, Supervisor, White Mountain National Forest, Gorham,
New Hampshire, (Dec. 8, 1998).
157. Id.
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Monument and the Uinta National Forest, which surrounds it.
However, because the federal fee program is a pilot program
scheduled to end in 2004, agencies lack a strong incentive to work out
complicated cooperative arrangements.
One result is a burgeoning black market in passes to Yellowstone
National Park. Because many Yellowstone visitors stay only a short
time, the seven-day, nontransferable entry pass has become popular
158
for trade. The Golden Eagle pass, which permits the purchaser
entry to any park for a year for $50, has also changed hands
159
According to news reports, in 1997 Yellowstone
illegally.
confiscated three hundred Golden Eagle passes used by individuals
other than the purchaser.160 The seized Golden Eagle permits had a
161
potential value to the park of $6,000. A single-day pass offered at a
lower price than the week-long permit would reduce such transfers.
This might also address any lingering concerns about equity and
fairness due to the Fee Demonstration Program. Along these same
lines, brochures and other information might be posted to assist
visitors in quickly selecting the most economical fee structure for
their needs.
D. Legal Constraints on User Fees
Prior to implementing user fees, public agencies must ensure
that fee programs, including the Fee Demonstration Program, must
162
meet important criteria established by courts. A number of cases
provide the parameters that agencies such as the National Park
System and Forest Service must follow in charging a fee for the
services they provide.
163
In National Cable Television Ass’n v. U.S., one of the seminal
cases on the validity of federal government user fees, the Supreme
Court held that a fee imposed on the cable industry was beyond the
Federal Communication Commission’s authority because it was
designed to recover the entire cost of administering the relevant
158. See HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 14, 1998. Long lines for cars without passes also
encourage this trade. “Express lane” entry passes, which are good for seven days, are sold at
twenty businesses in West Yellowstone to help prevent backup at the West gate. While popular
in the winter months, they are rarely used during peak summer months.
159. See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 15.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 92, at 827 (explaining that case law and federal
legislation requires a discernable connection between user fees and discernible benefits).
163. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
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regulatory program.164 The authority to impose fees, found in the
Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, limits such fees to
165
the “value to the recipient.” The Court has explained that, unlike a
tax that Congress may simply impose through legislation, a fee is
incident to a voluntary act on the part of a person requesting some
form of service from a government agency.166 By acting in response to
the voluntary request, the government agency is bestowing a benefit
167
on the “requestor,” and thus may charge a fee in exchange. In
recovering the cost of the entire program, the FCC was charging the
cable companies not only the value of the services rendered but also
for the protection of the public interest society received through the
implementation of the regulatory program.168 The Court remanded the
case so that the FCC could revise the fee to eliminate this improper
“surcharge” on the cable companies.
In the companion case, Federal Power Comm’n v. New England
169
Power Co., the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Power
Commission could not charge electric and gas utilities in addition to
the annual filing fees, levies to recover the costs of administering
regulatory programs. 170 The Federal Power Commission argued that it
was entitled to recover the entire cost of the regulatory program that
had been instrumental in fostering the financial stability of utilities in
both industries.171 The Court ruled that imposing a fee in this manner
was not only inconsistent with the power to levy fees under the
Independent Offices Appropriations Act, but was also more
consistent with a tax since the fee was not associated with any specific
service.172 Specifically, the Court stated:
Though it greatly narrows the dimensions urged by the
Commission, it keeps within the boundaries of the “fee” system and
away from the domain of “taxes” toward which the Commission’s

164. Id. at 343-44.
165. 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1994).
166. See National Cable Television Ass’n, 415 U.S. at 340 (explaining that taxation is a
legislative function that may be imposed without any associated benefits where a fee is related
to a voluntary request that bestows a unique benefit on the recipient).
167. Id. at 340-41.
168. Id. at 341-42 (asserting that a charge the recoups the cost of providing benefits to
society as a whole is akin to imposing a tax).
169. 415 U.S. 345 (1974).
170. 31 U.S. § 483a.
171. See Federal Power Comm’n., 415 U.S. at 347-48 (describing the Commission’s position
that by ensuring financial stability the regulatory program directly benefited all electric and gas
utilities).
172. See id. at 349-50.
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“economic climate” argument would lead. Some of the assessments
made by the Commission . . . would be on companies [that] had no
proceedings before the Commission during the year in question.
The “identifiable recipient” of a unit of service from which “he
derives a special benefit,” . . . does not describe members of an
industry, which have neither asked for nor received the
173
Commission’s services during the year in question.

Plainly, the decision to visit a national park is a voluntary act.
Thus, in principle the Fee Demonstration Program complies with the
requirement that federal user fees be imposed on those voluntarily
availing themselves of the benefit of government services. Unlike the
regulatory programs under the Federal Power or Natural Gas Act,
fees imposed on park visitors through the Fee Demonstration
Program are identified with beneficiaries of the specific government
services, the ability to enter and enjoy the recreational opportunities
of national parks, at least for the 80 percent of the fees that remain in
the parks where they have been collected. On the other hand, the
remaining 20 percent of the fees are distributed to parks other than
those where the fee was collected. At least this portion of the fee
looks more like a tax, placing the Fee Demonstration Program in
jeopardy of running afoul of New England Power Co.
Later in National Cable Television Ass’n v. Federal
174
Communications Comm’n, the cable industry challenged the annual
authorization fee the Commission imposed as compared to the filing
175
fee addressed in the earlier action. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that the annual authorization fee, based on
the number of system subscribers, was not reasonably related to the
cost of service.176 However, the court did not require that there be an
exact relationship between the fee and the benefit conferred. Instead,
all that is required is a “reasonable relationship” between the fee and
the cost of providing the service that confers the requisite benefit on
the recipient.177 Clearly, the user fees assessed through the Fee
Demonstration Program must be related to the cost of providing
natural and recreational as well as other park services. Examples of
the use of the fees collected through the current program, including
trash collection, repair of restroom facilities and roads, described in
173. Id. at 351.
174. 554 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
175. Id. at 1096.
176. Id. at 1108-09 (asserting that no evidence in the record established a relationship
between the number of subscribers in a cable television system and the cost or regulation).
177. Id. (explaining that administrative ease may be considered in calculating a fee).
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greater detail in Part VI below, demonstrate a reasonable relationship
between the current fees and the cost of providing the park services.
The rule of National Cable Television Ass’n, however, does provide a
warning that government agencies should not view the Fee
Demonstration Program as a “profit making” opportunity that could
be used to fund unrelated priorities for which their general budget is
insufficient. The validity of the Fee Demonstrations Program is
called into question again by this decision due to the allocation of 20
percent of the fees to other parks.
Similarly, in Seafarers International Union of North America v.
178
United States Coast Guard, a more recent case, the Court of
Appeals for District of Columbia affirmed the lower court’s ruling
that the Coast Guard was permitted to charge fees for issuing
merchant marine licenses, certificates of registry or merchant marine
documentation.179 The fees covered the cost of processing
applications, proctoring and grading examinations along with
180
notification of individual results and issuing licenses and certificates.
The private benefit the Coast Guard conferred on the applicants was
181
the ability to pursue professional employment. On the other hand,
the Coast Guard was prohibited from charging applicants for the FBI
background checks performed as part of the process.
The
background checks conferred primarily a public benefit in terms of
overall maritime safety, as compared to the private benefit of
professional employment.182
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the
district court on this matter. The court reasoned that so long as a user
fee is within the authority the organic statute confers the relative
weight of the private versus public benefit is irrelevant. After
analyzing the authorizing statute, the court found that the FBI
background checks were intended to fulfill a statutory requirement
that the Coast Guard deny the applications of those who have been
183
convicted of a drug related crime within the last ten years.
The
Coast Guard was permitted to charge a fee because employing FBI

178. 81 F.3d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
179. Id. at 181.
180. Id. at 181-82.
181. Id. at 182 (concurring with the District court that the Coast Guard’s merchant marine
licensing program conferred individualized private benefit justifying the imposition of user fees
under National Cable Television Ass’n).
182. Id.
183. 46 U.S.C. § 7503(b)(1)(2000).
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background checks was a reasonable way to complete this statutorily
184
required portion of the application process. However, the court did
state that to the extent that FBI background checks reviewed criminal
histories beyond those required in the organic statute, the Coast
Guard would have to prorate the fee.185 Therefore, Seafarers
International provides another important reminder that the park fees
should not exceed the authority conferred in the 1996 enabling
legislation. To date, while several people have questioned whether
charging a fee is consistent with the original purpose of the national
park system as conceived in the 19th century,186 no one has questioned
that the fees are within the authority Congress provided in the
legislation authorizing the Fee Demonstration Program.
Finally, in a case whose circumstances most closely resemble
those of the Fee Demonstration Program, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a $150 fee imposed by the Surface Transportation
Board to process requests to use or acquire to-be-abandoned railroad
187
rights-of-way for interim recreational purposes or rail banking. This
program is designed to preserve railroad rights-of-way and foster
188
development of nature trails as recreation opportunities. Under this
program, third parties apply to the Surface Transportation Board to
use the right-of-way for temporary recreational trail use and rail
banking. As part of this application, the third party agrees to accept
financial responsibility, including any taxes, legal liability and
management costs, for the right-of-way.189 By accepting such
responsibility, the third party prevents an official “abandonment” of
the right-of-way that would result in the interest reverting to the
property owner and allows the Surface Transportation to maintain
190
jurisdiction for potential reactivation for railroad use in the future.

184. Seafarers Int’l Union, 81 F.3d at 185-86.
185. Id. at 185-86 (holding that to the extent that the background check “sweeps more
broadly than the statutory authorization” then the full cost of the background check should not
be assessed against the applicant).
186. For example, notwithstanding the tremendous potential of the Fee Demonstration
Program to provide an important source of needed funding, one need only enter “Fee
Demonstration Program” into any general internet search engine to find numerous web pages
protesting the “concept” of charging to enter national parks.
187. See Nebraska Trails Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 120 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 1997).
188. Id. at 903.
189. Id. at 904.
190. Id. at 904.

091103PODOLSKY.DOC

09/24/03 3:17 PM

Spring 2003] A STRATEGY FOR RESTORING AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARKS

179

In Nebraska Trails Council, the fee was promulgated under
section 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act,191 while the cable
television fees were implemented through Federal Communications
order after notice and a hearing. Further, in imposing the fee the
Surface Transportation Board has carefully delineated those who
receive a special benefit from those who do not. The fee was imposed
for trail use conditions and not environmental or historic preservation
conditions because the latter two do not receive any identifiable
special benefit as required under Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n and
U.S. Fed. Power Comm’n v. New England Power Co. The special
benefits in Nebraska Trails Council included the processing of the
trail use request and the opportunity to negotiate with a railroad to
secure the right-of-way for a 180-day period without concern of
abandonment (and reversion of the property interest to the original
owner).192 The concern in this case is not a concern in the context of
the Fee Demonstration Program. By imposing entrance fees only on
park visitors, there is no need to delineate between those who receive
the special benefit and those who do not.
Moreover, in contrast to Nat’l Cable Televisions Ass’n where a
“reasonable relationship test” was applied, the court in Nebraska
Trails Council claimed to have reviewed the fee based on an
193
arbitrary and capricious standard. However, the court ultimately
assesses the fee based on its reasonableness as an approximation of
the actual cost of providing trail use request processing services.194
Thus, the “reasonable relationship” test appears to be the standard
that fees charged at national parks under the Fee Demonstration
Program will have to meet.195 Again, these cases merely reiterate the
point that the user fees must be reasonable and should not be used to
subsidize unrelated government programs. In so doing, the courts
have placed an indirect check to ensure that government agencies,
including those authorized under the Fee Demonstration Program, do
not exceed the authority Congress has provided.
191. Id. at 905 (explaining that under § 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act agency
actions are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard and generally receive
substantial deference from the judiciary).
192. Id. at 906-07.
193. Id. at 905 (holding that the scope of the court’s review was limited to reviewing whether
the regulation implementing the fee was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise no in accordance with the law”).
194. Id. at 908 (explaining that the fee was reasonable having been based on a careful study
of costs the Board incurred in processing trail use requests).
195. Id. at 908.
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In addition, the empirical evidence shows that the Fee
Demonstration program adequately addresses the judicial standards
of fairness. In Nebraska Trails Council,196 the court found that the
Surface Transportation Board, by lowering the application fee from
$650 to $150, had addressed the concern that some might be
discouraged from seeking trail use conditions.197 In other words, the
fee was reasonable and fair. Similarly, the entrance fees charged
under the Fee Demonstration Program are reasonable. Given the
vast extent of services provided at a national park including roads,
restroom facilities, park rangers, trash collection, etc., a $20 fee for an
entire family to enter for seven days is undoubtedly reasonable.
Further, beyond the $20 fee, Yellowstone offers a variety of fees to
accommodate different needs. For example, an Annual Area Pass,
good for Yellowstone and Grand Teton national parks for a year, is
available for only $40.198 Indeed there are a number of options
including the Golden Access Passport,199 Golden Age Passport200 and
201
Golden Eagle Passport.
Moreover, as Nebraska Trails Council stated, “Given that the
$150 fee represents only a small portion of the funds a trail use
requester must amass in assuming financial responsibility for a
railroad right-of-way, this burden does not seem excessively
202
onerous.” As shown above, with entrance fees ranging from only as
much as 4.8 percent to as little as 0.7 percent of the total cost of a trip,

196. Id.
197. Id. at 907 (describing this fee reduction as appropriately addressing public policy
concerns that the fee will deter applicants from seeking trail use conditions). Further, the
Surface Transportation Board had implemented a waiver system that the court found addressed
fairness concerns even though an applicant might have to first pay the fee and then seek a
waiver and refund. Id.
198. Yellowstone National Park.Com available at http://www.yellowstonenationalpark.com/
information.htm (last modified on June 28, 2003).
199. Id. The Golden Access Passport is available to the blind or disabled at any federal
lands where an entrance fee is charged. Holders of the Golden Access Passport and anyone
accompanying them in a private non-commercial capacity are admitted free to federal areas that
charge entrance fees. Id.
200. See id. The Golden Age Passport may be obtained by persons over sixty-two years of
age for a one-time fee of $10. Holders of the Golden Age Passport and anyone accompanying
them in a private non-commercial capacity are admitted free to federal areas that charge
entrance fees. Id.
201. See id. The Golden Eagle Passport, good for one year from the date of purchase, may
be purchased by persons of any age and is good for admission at any federal area where an
admission fee is charged. Id.
202. See Nebraska Trails, 120 F.3d at 907 n.4.
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the Fee Demonstration Program cannot be considered excessively
onerous.
IV. FEES IN STATE PARK SYSTEMS
As the federal government moves ahead with fees, it can learn a
lot from state park systems, some of which have experienced fiscal
restraints in recent years. In some cases, state legislators have told
their park managers that they must start supporting themselves, a
trend that is pushing state park systems toward fiscal self-sufficiency
203
Indeed, several states have statutes authorizing
and innovation.
entrance and user fees at their state parks.
In 1980, general taxes supported 64 percent of total state park
budgets. In 1997, that figure had fallen to 36 percent. User fees rose
204
from 17 percent of spending in 1980 to 34 percent in 1997. A few
state park systems have cut all fiscal ties, giving autonomy to park
management.
New Hampshire
The New Hampshire Division of Parks and Recreation is
required to finance the department’s nearly $5 million operating
budget as well as a portion of construction improvements from user
fees. As a result of this pressure, New Hampshire became the first
state park system to implement differential pricing. A campground
with a scenic view may cost more than one without, and higher prices
are charged during periods of peak demand. Such differential fees
send signals to park managers about what visitors prefer and are
willing to pay. They also help disperse visitors throughout the park
system and throughout the year, increasing visitation during shoulder
seasons.205
Texas
With over 500,000 acres and more than 24 million visitors a year,
the Texas state park system became self-sufficient in 1994. Three
years earlier, the state legislature announced that general funds,
which covered 60 percent of the park system budget, would be
203. See Leal & Fretwell, supra note 18, at 9.
204. See NAT’L. ASSOC. OF STATE PARK DIRECTORS, ANNUAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE:
STATE PARK STATISTICAL DATA FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1980 11, 14 (1981);
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE PARK DIRECTORS, THE 1998 ANNUAL INFORMATION
EXCHANGE: A STATISTICAL REPORT OF STATE PARK OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1,
1996 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1997 29, 43 (1998).
205. See Leal & Fretwell, supra note 18, at 12.
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eliminated from the system except for a small tax on recreational
equipment sales designated for parks. After contemplating closure of
a number of parks, state park officials redesigned the system. Park
managers were given incentives to raise revenues and cut costs. A
portion of the higher park receipts would remain within the park
where they were generated, and all savings were to be applied to the
following year’s budget.206
Although there have been some problems in carrying out the
207
plan, park managers quickly became innovative in providing services
to park visitors and in protecting resources. For example, visitors at
Brazos Bend State Park can enjoy a two-hour nocturnal “owl prowl”
for $3 per person or watch alligators from a pontoon boat for $8 per
person. Huntsville State Park holds trail runs, “fun runs,” and an
annual “canoe rendezvous” that generate as much as $7,000
annually.208
Though fee generation has become a priority, resource
protection is still critical. The additional money generated at Brazos
Bend State Park helped pay for a plant shredder to create small
209
openings for wildlife in dense areas of vegetation. A comparison of
Big Bend National Park in Texas with nearby Big Bend Ranch State
210
Park underscores the continued importance of resource protection.
The national park faces serious deterioration of facilities and trails,
yet there is no deliberate effort to control where visitors go in order
211
to limit their impact on the park trails. In contrast, Big Bend Ranch
State Park is divided into zones in which the number of visitors at any
given time is strictly controlled. Environmentally sensitive areas are
monitored to assess the effects of public use, and visitors can be
rerouted to minimize harmful human impacts.212

206. Id.
207. Because incentive payments came from anticipated revenues rather than current
earnings, a year of drought in 1996 and flooding in 1997 left Texas parks in the red. Funds were
insufficient to cover all operating expenses and incentive payments. As a result, incentive
payments were eliminated from the system in 1998. Interview with John Emerson, Texas Parks
& Wildlife Department, June 2, 1998.
208. See Leal & Fretwell, supra note 18, at 14.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 20-25.
211. See TEXAN PARKS AND WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT, BIG BEND NATIONAL PARK: STATE
OF THE PARK REPORT: BIG BEND NATIONAL PARK RIO GRANDE WILD AND SCENIC RIVER 7
(1996).
212. See TEXAS PARKS AND WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT, BIG BEND RANCH STATE NATURAL
AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN 21 (1994).
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In addition, a portion of park revenues is placed into a statewide
fund to help maintain parks that have ecological value but do not
attract enough visitors to be self-supporting. As Huntsville State
Park Superintendent Wilburn Cox said, “Protection of our natural
resources remains our first priority.”213
Other Parks
Other examples illustrate the vitality and accountability that
come from relying on visitors, not taxpayers, for funds:
• Baxter State Park is different from most state parks in
Maine, which are funded almost entirely by tax dollars. The
park, originally purchased and donated by former Governor
Percival Baxter, was later designated Baxter State Park. The
park, now over 200,000 acres of wilderness, is a paradise for
the naturalist, mountain climber, hiker, and photographer.
User fees and interest earned from the park’s trust fund left
214
by the late governor pay all park expenses. Consistent with
Governor Baxter’s wishes, the park has been reluctant to
accept funding with strings attached, and it recently cut its
final tie with state government by declining an $80,000
215
Park managers
annual allocation for road maintenance.
control access by limiting the size of parking lots and
trailheads. The state was putting pressure on the park to
widen roads and enlarge parking lots, so the park turned
down the funding.216
• In 1992, after a series of budget cuts, the park system of
Bellevue, a city near Seattle, Washington, formed an
Enterprise Division.
This division raises revenues by
charging market fees for activities such as golf, swimming,
tennis, boat launching, company picnics, weddings, and
basketball, volleyball, and softball leagues—activities
previously supported by tax dollars. Grants and donations
enable low-income people to participate without paying the
fees. The division generated $20,207 more revenue than
217
expenses in 1997.

213. Interview with Wilburn Cox, Superintendent, Huntsville State Park (Jan. 1996).
214. Interview with Roxanna McLean, Administrative Secretary, Baxter State Park (Aug. 5,
1999).
215. See Mary Anne Lagasse, Baxter Declines DOT Road Funding, BANGOR (MAINE)
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 15, 1999.
216. See Fretwell, supra note 19, at 18.
217. See BELLEVUE PARKS AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, 1997 ENTERPRISE DIVISION
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On the 1.6 million acres of the Fort Apache Reservation in
east-central Arizona, the White Mountain Apache Tribe has
created a rich array of recreation opportunities. Visitors pay
to hunt, fish, and camp. Hunting options range from
inexpensive hunts for small game to expeditions for trophy
elk that can cost $12,500 or more. By offering different
experiences at different prices, the White Mountain Apache
obtain funds for wildlife management and research and
protection of the endangered Apache trout and the Mexican
spotted owl.218

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The Fee Demonstration Program provides the first step toward
achieving Congress’ original vision of self-sufficient federal parks and
recreation lands. Not only is there a sound legal foundation for the
program, but also making the Fee Demonstration Program
permanent and expanding it to all federal recreational lands would
take us further toward this goal.
• A permanent program would allow agencies to make longterm plans for recreation development, to invest in start-up
costs needing amortization over several years, and to justify
the commitment of time required to design interagency fees
and passes. (Incentives for long-term planning are missing
since the Fee Demonstration Program is scheduled to end in
2004.)
• Expanding the program to include all federal areas, not just
the several hundred currently in the program, would
motivate managers to give resource stewardship and
provision of basic services priority over politics and to keep
prices low while still increasing revenues. The program
would provide individual managers with autonomy and the
direct accountability that accompanies it.
• Legislation prohibiting fee collection at certain sites or
limiting use of fee receipts should be repealed. All legislation
must be consistent with program guidelines and all public
219
recreation activities should fit agency missions.
ANNUAL REPORT (Bellevue, WA) 6 (1997).
218. See Terry L. Anderson, Conservation - Native American Style, PERC POLICY SERIES,
(July 1996) available at http://www.perc.org/publications/policyseries/conservation.php?s=2 (last
visited September 5, 2003).
219. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
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Layered and excessive fees should be eliminated.
Expanding the program will allow privately operated parks,
campgrounds, etc. to compete on an even playing field. By
increasing the fees and improving their services, privately
owned recreation areas will no longer have to compete with
under-priced public alternatives.
• All fees should remain in the park where collected to ensure
that the program does not violate the legal restrictions on
governmental implementation of a fee system.
Both the federal Fee Demonstration Program and the experience
of state and local parks illustrate the benefits of visitor fee systems.
However, the greatest shortcoming of the Fee Demonstration
Program is its inability to address agency expenditures. Congress still
finances the vast majority of the federal agencies’ budgets through
appropriations. As long as this practice remains the status quo,
agencies have little incentive to control costs except those linked to
the demonstration program (the more efficient they are in using those
fees, the more money they have to use at their discretion). Other
unspent funds (such as congressional appropriations) must still be
returned to the national treasury, and Congress will still determine
the bulk of their budgets. The motivation to drive up budgets still
exists, and opportunities for political interference still abound.
Ultimately, costs and revenues will come into line only if the
parks and other units are required to fully fund themselves. To
achieve that end, more drastic steps are required.
• To bring in competition and fiscal prudence, budget
appropriations should be frozen at their present levels.
Additional funds must come from other sources. These
additional revenues would be used at the individual parks
where they are collected, and any cost savings by the park
manager could be used in subsequent years. Managers must
have the flexibility to use revenues as they see fit, while also
220
being required to meet their budgets.
• Ultimately, most federal parks and recreation sites should be
financially self-sufficient. The discipline of self-support
would reduce park managers’ fiscal promiscuity and curtail
pressure to initiate congressional pet projects.
RECREATIONAL FEE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL
YEAR 1998, 42 (1999) (explaining that currently some fee activities are not included under the
scope of the program, such as permits for outfitters and guides).
220. Managers must continue to abide by agency goals and missions.
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It is true that some lands under federal management are not
likely to become financially self-sufficient. These should be placed
under the umbrella of a trust or endowment system. 221 A portion of
fees from agency and interagency park passes could help pay their
way.
Many people are troubled by the state of our national parks and
the heavy costs to taxpayers of recreation on other federal lands.
Misplaced incentives direct federal land managers to respond to the
whims of political forces rather than to conserving and showcasing
their natural resources. By changing these incentives, we can
encourage federal land managers to be more responsive to visitors,
more responsible with maintenance, and more protective of natural
resources. A move toward self-sufficiency must be made to protect
and restore our public lands in the twenty-first century.

221. See Richard Stroup & John Baden, Endowment Areas: A Clearing in the Policy
Wilderness? 2 CATO JOURNAL 91-108 (1982).

